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IS AMERICA A SYSTEMATIC VIOLATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE?* 
STEPHEN C. THAMAN** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The cynical answer to the question asked in the title of this essay is: Yes, it 
comes with the turf of being a superpower.  Superpowers are arrogant.  They 
need not listen to other nations.  Our former nemesis, the Soviet Union, was a 
systematic violator of human rights.  After its collapse, however, most 
successor states of that “evil empire” have petitioned to join the Council of 
Europe—the “civilized world”—and have been compelled to shed the worst 
practices of Communist times: use of the death penalty, violations of the rights 
of the defense, and the lack of an independent judiciary.  They still have a long 
way to go, but they are on the right track.  Our only competitor as a 
superpower nowadays, China, goes it alone as we do, and significantly out-
trumps us as a systematic human rights violator. 
We selectively brand other countries as “violators of human rights” in our 
yearly reports, yet cast a blind eye as to our own serious deficiencies—blithely 
sending criminal justice “experts” to former Communist countries and the 
developing world to aid them in instituting the rule of law.  I have participated 
in such efforts.  I strongly believe that it is not the theory behind our system of 
criminal justice that is flawed; it is the horrors that have resulted from its 
politicization and, to a certain extent, its commercialization.  Our Bill of Rights 
was a progressive document in 1791 when it was enacted.  It is still a sufficient 
backbone when the courts interpret it with compassion and in a manner 
consistent with human dignity.  Unfortunately, our courts have not been up to 
the task.  Politicians and law enforcement officials have capitalized on the 
courts’ narrow and often cruel jurisprudence, creating a situation that has been 
criticized as violative of human rights both at home and abroad. 
The foundation for the protection of the rights of criminal defendants in the 
United States is found in the Bill of Rights, which is the first ten amendments 
 
* A Spanish-language version of this paper was given at the University of the Basque Country on 
March 7, 2000, as part of its Third Annual Course in Human Rights. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, U.S.A. 
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to the U.S. Constitution.1  These amendments were enacted in 1791 to 
compensate for the lack of a catalogue of such rights in the original 1787 
document.2  It is in the first eight of these amendments that the bulk of 
protections for citizens suspected of, or charged with, committing criminal 
offenses are found.3  The one exception is the right to trial by jury.4  I here 
trace the development of these rights in the context of the two most pernicious 
human rights violations plaguing the United States: the death penalty and 
racism in the enforcement of criminal laws. 
The United States and Japan are the only industrialized democracies that 
still impose the death penalty, but the United States uses the death penalty 
much more frequently and has a dismal record of convicting the innocent.5  
Since 1973, at least eighty-seven innocent persons have been released after 
being sentenced to death for crimes they did not commit.6  No one knows how 
many innocent people languish in prison for non-capital crimes they did not 
commit.  The United States also imprisons more people per capita than any 
other country in the world, except, perhaps, Russia.7  The “prison industry” is 
one of the fastest growing in the United States.8  Communities fight with each 
other over the opportunity to have prisons built in their regions to provide jobs 
and a tax base.9  In California, for instance, the union of prison guards is a 
 
 1. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I-X. 
 2. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791 119-25 
(rev. ed. 1983). 
 3. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I-VIII. 
 4. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 5. See generally BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000); Eric Zorn, Differing 
Views on Death Penalty Prove Same Thing, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 1998 at 1 (quoting Justice 
Moses W. Harrison II of the Illinois Supreme Court). 
 6. Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2000, at A1, A16; John Kifner, A State Votes to End its Dealth Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2000, at A16. 
 7. In February of 2000 the prison population of the United States rose to two million.  The 
United States may now imprison a higher percentage of its population than any nation in history.  
Although the United States has only five percent of the world’s population, it has twenty-five 
percent of the world’s prisoners. Duncan Campbell, U.S. Jails Two-Millionth Inmate, 
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Feb. 17-23, 2000, at 1.  In 1998 the rate of incarceration in 
the U.S. was 668 inmates per 100,000 individuals, up from 313 inmates per 100,000 individuals 
in 1985. Fox Butterfield, Number of Inmates Reaches Record 1.8 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 
1999, at A14.  This rate is at least five times greater than most industrialized nations.  Russia’s 
rate in 1994 was 558 individuals incarcerated per 100,000 unincarcerated individuals, at that time 
higher than the United States.  America Behind Bars, SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT, Fall 1995, at 5. 
 8. Craig Haney, Riding the Punishment Wave: On the Origins of our Devolving Standards 
of Decency, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 27, 65-66, 68 (1998). 
 9. Kurt Miniclier, Akron County Ponders Lockup as Start-up, DENVER POST, Feb. 23, 
1999. 
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powerful force in lobbying for stiffer sentencing laws.10  Large portions of 
those incarcerated are members of minority groups, especially African-
Americans.11 
In observing these trends one finds a disturbing politicization of the 
administration of criminal justice.  Candidates for political office promise to be 
tougher in enforcing the death penalty, to stiffen penalties for non-capital 
crimes, and to build more prisons.12  Politically elected judges try to show how 
tough they can be in their sentences,13 and politically elected prosecutors seek 
maximum sentences and cheat and bend the law to garner convictions.14 
How could this happen in one the world’s oldest democracies, a country 
with one of the oldest charters of freedom, in the midst of unprecedented 
economic prosperity?  Why are there still dreadful pockets of poverty in the 
countryside, and, worst of all, in the decaying and haunted cities?15  Why do 
politicians vote to imprison more and more of the poor who violate the law due 
to poverty, ignorance, and degradation, rather than use some of the 
unprecedented wealth to ameliorate these problems? 
 
 10. Haney, supra note 8, at 67-8, 70-1. 
 11. See Fox Butterfield, Study Examines Race and Justice in California, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 
13, 1996, at A12.  Almost 40% of black men in their twenties in California are imprisoned, or on 
probation or parole on any given day, in comparison with 5% of whites and 11% of Hispanics in 
that age group.  Blacks make up 18% of those arrested and 32% of the prison population.  In New 
York approximately one of every three black men in his twenties is in prison, on probation, or on 
parole.  Id.  Blacks and Hispanic juveniles are also treated more severely throughout the juvenile 
justice system than white teenagers charged with comparable crimes.  Fox Butterfield, Racial 
Disparities Seen as Pervasive in Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2000, at A1, A18. 
 12. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 
(1995).  The sons of ex-president George Bush are good examples.  George W. Bush, Governor 
of Texas, is proud that under his administration, Texas has the largest criminal justice system in 
country with 545,000 people in prison or jail or on probation or parole. Prisons in Texas hold 724 
inmates for every 100,000 residents, second only to Louisiana with 736.  Minnesota has the 
lowest incarceration rate with 117 inmates per 100,000 Minnesota citizens. In Texas, money had 
to be taken away from public education to build more prisons. George W. Bush also presided 
over a record 127 executions.  He claims all of these individuals were guilty!  Paul Duggan, In 
Texas, Defense Lapses Fail to Halt Executions, WASH. POST, May 12, 2000, at A1.  Jeb Bush, 
Governor of Florida, recently agreed to sign a bill replacing electrocution with lethal injection, 
but only if legislation passed that would shorten the wait on death row from ten years to five 
years. See generally id. 
 13. See generally Bright & Keenan, supra note 12, at 768. 
 14. Ken Armstrong & Maurise Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 
1. 
 15. A study has shown that poor children in the United States are poorer than children in 
most other Western industrialized nations. Only in Israel and Ireland are poor children worse off. 
Keith Bradsher, Low Ranking for Poor American Children, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at A7. 
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II. THE BELATED ENFORCEMENT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ON A NATIONAL 
SCALE 
The Bill of Rights was enacted to limit the power of the new federal 
government, and thereby ensure continuing sovereignty of the state 
governments.  The protections for criminal defendants in the first eight 
amendments were not meant to apply directly to state governments.16  Almost 
all criminal law was the province of the states.  Federal law originally punished 
only uniquely federal crimes: treason, smuggling, and crimes involving more 
than one state.17  Only when the federal government began enacting crimes of 
sedition, prohibition, and later regulatory offenses involving narcotics and 
other health and safety hazards, did the federal government prosecute more 
criminal cases.18 
The states all had their own constitutions, bills of rights, penal codes, and 
procedural rules.  The states’ bills of rights mirrored those of the federal 
system, but enforcement and interpretation of those rights varied from state to 
state.  Blacks in southern states suffered the worst fate.  If they were not 
lynched when suspected of a crime, a farcical jury trial could be orchestrated.  
This usually ended in their execution, taking only a little more time than it 
would have taken to lynch them in the first place.19  There was no right to 
appeal a criminal case until the late Nineteenth Century, so higher courts had 
no occasion to rule on the meaning and enforcement of the various 
amendments to the constitution.20 
With the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
after the Civil War in 1865, a vehicle was created to enforce the requirements 
of the U.S. Bill of Rights on the states.  It provided: “nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”21  
The Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Thirteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, were enacted to protect the freed slaves after the Civil War.  For 
many years, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized as violations of “due process” 
only those practices that were contrary to “immutable principles of justice, as 
 
 16. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 17. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 
46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138 (1999). 
 18. Id. at 1139. 
 19. At least 4743 people were killed by lynch mobs, and 90% of those were in the South.  
Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: the Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in 
Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 440 (1995).  Three-quarters of the 
victims were black. Id.  The death penalty with white juries was seen to legalize such lynchings. 
Id.  Only a few days elapsed from arrest to jury verdict and execution.  Georgia was the bloodiest 
state, executing 337 black people and 75 whites from 1924 through 1972.  Id. at 441. 
 20. U.S. v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 88 (1978). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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conceived by a civilized society”22 or those which were “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty [without which] a fair and enlightened system of 
justice would be imperfect.”23  This did not include all of the provisions 
included in the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights, such as double 
jeopardy, right to jury trial, right to be free of unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to indictment by 
Grand Jury.24  The states remained free to interpret their own constitutions in 
this respect without interference by the U.S. Supreme Court, unless the 
conduct was barbarous or uncivilized. 
The U.S. Supreme Court did reverse convictions of state defendants, often 
when it determined that confessions were extracted by torture, coercion, 
deception, or other practices that made the confession involuntary.25  It also 
overturned the notorious conviction of the Scottsboro Boys in Alabama 
because the young boys were convicted without the aid of a lawyer26 in a 
capital case (rape was a capital case at that time).27 
During the Civil Rights Movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
however, things began to change.  A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that the notion of “due process” in the Fourteenth Amendment 
included nearly all of the rights protected in the first eight amendments of the 
Bill of Rights: the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and 
search warrants based on less than probable cause, guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment,28 and the right to exclude evidence seized in violation thereof;29 
the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment;30 the 
protection against double jeopardy, also guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment;31 
the rights to a speedy and public trial,32 trial by jury,33 to confronted the 
prosecutions witnesses,34 to have compulsory process for obtaining defense 
witnesses35 and to have the assistance of counsel,36 all guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment; and the protection against cruel and unusual punishment 
 
 22. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 23. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 24. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
 25. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 282 (1936). 
 26. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 27. Id. at 50. 
 28. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 30. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 31. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
 32. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1965). 
 33. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 34. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.  400 (1965). 
 35. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
 36. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.37  Today, the only right not binding on 
the states through the Due Process Clause is the right to indictment by Grand 
Jury, guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.38  The protection against excessive 
bail is assumed to be part of due process, but the U.S. Supreme Court has 
never explicitly held so in a state case.39 
The enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states has been called the 
“criminal procedure revolution”40 and it took place primarily during the term 
of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1958-1969).  
Conservative appointments to the Supreme Court by presidents Richard Nixon 
(1968-1974), Ronald Reagan (1980-1988), and George Bush (1988-1992), 
however, gradually undermined protections read into the Constitution by the 
Warren Court. 
Decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have produced a number of 
undesirable results.  First, police may unfairly target minorities in the 
enforcement of narcotics and weapons laws.41  Second, police interrogations 
have become more coercive and inquisitorial,42 falling below standards 
recognized in Western Europe,43 and have lead to the conviction of innocent 
people.44  Third, undercover police informants not only surreptitiously gather 
evidence against suspects and defendants, but also testify in court as witnesses 
for the prosecution,45 occasionally leading to the imposition of death sentences 
against innocent persons.46  Fourth, the ruling that the death penalty is neither 
cruel and unusual punishment nor a violation of due process has led to 
increasing death judgments and their quicker execution.47  Fifth, a system of 
draconian punishments, combined with the power of the prosecution to grant 
leniency, has produced a system in which there usually are no trials because 
defendants plead guilty to minimize their losses.48  Finally, ineffective 
assistance of counsel for indigent defendants has contributed to miscarriages of 
justice.49 
 
 37. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 38. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
 39. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 67 (2d ed. 1992). 
 40. Cf. CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 
(1993). 
 41. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. 
 42. See infra notes 86-106 and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., §§ 163a(3), 136 StPO (Germany); §§ 63, 64(3), 350 CPP (Italy); § 520(2)(a)-
(c) LECr (Spain); Art. 51 Const. RF (Russia). 
 44. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 45. See infra notes 107-113 and accompanying text. 
 46. Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois: The Inside 
Informant, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1999, at 1, 8-9. 
 47. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. 
 48. At least 90% of defendants plead guilty. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 899. 
 49. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text. 
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This combination of factors has contributed to a flawed criminal justice 
system where the poor are a target for serious invasions of protected interests 
and are then convicted in trials with inadequate assistance of counsel.  These 
convictions are based on evidence that is not only of questionable probative 
value, but also has often been gathered in suspect manners.50  Juries are kept in 
the dark about many aspects of the case and are unable to discern the 
weaknesses of the prosecution’s case or properly assess the credibility of 
prosecution witnesses.51  Police and undercover informants routinely lie about 
evidence on the witness stand.52  Prosecutors intentionally allow this to 
happen, refusing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and using improper tactics 
and arguments to influence the jury.53  Finally, judges, who, along with 
prosecutors, are usually elected at the state level, are unwilling or unable to 
stop these questionable practices or to set aside unsafe verdicts returned by 
juries.54 
III. POLICE HARASSMENT, DETENTION AND SEARCHING OF MINORITIES 
Following its decision to apply the Fourth Amendment and its 
exclusionary rule to the states,55 the Warren Court attempted to limit the power 
of the police in its confrontations with citizens, especially minorities.56  The 
Court had previously held that searches and seizures of the person could only 
be conducted upon “probable cause” that the person had committed a crime, or 
that evidence of a crime, contraband, or instrumentalities of crime could be 
found on the person or in the person’s home or effects.57  This left the juridical 
interpretation of the typical police-citizen encounter in limbo.  Did this mean 
that police could not detain someone to investigate crime unless they already 
had “probable cause” of the person’s guilt? 
In 1968, a year of racial riots following the assassination of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., the Supreme Court noted the practice of harassment of black citizens 
by predominantly white police forces in the investigation of a crime,58 but 
 
 50. See infra notes 55-113 and accompanying text. 
 51. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text. 
 52. David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
455, 456-59 (1999).  On “testilying,” see Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 396-403 
(1999). 
 53. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. 
 54. McClurg, supra note 52, at 403-06.  On how popularly elected judges refuse to set aside 
death sentences and yet impose the death penalty when a jury recommends only a life sentence in 
the four states where this is still possible, see Bright & Keenan, supra note 12, at 793. 
 55. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 56. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 57. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 58. See generally id. 
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decided, that a “temporary detention” could be conducted on less than 
“probable cause,” that is, upon a reasonable suspicion that a person had, or was 
about to, commit a criminal offense.59  The Court also held that if an officer 
reasonably feared for his safety, he could conduct a superficial pat-search of 
the suspect’s outer clothing to see if he or she was carrying a weapon.60  The 
police could only remove items from the suspect’s clothing if they were hard 
and in the shape of a weapon (usually a knife or firearm).61  The courts were 
careful to indicate that a person could not be “temporarily detained” because of 
the fact that he was located in a “high crime community,”62 because of the 
color of his skin,63 or because he walked or ran away from the oncoming police 
due to the tension between predominantly white police officers policing the 
black community.64  There had to be some objective information or conduct 
indicating the person had committed, or was about to, commit a crime. 
The post-Warren Supreme Court undermined these protections in many 
ways.  They allowed police officers to remove drugs from a suspect following 
a pat-search if they could immediately articulate that the object was 
contraband.65  The Court held that it was not a violation for the police to 
attempt to detain a person unlawfully, as long as that person had not submitted 
to the unlawful attempt before discarding incriminating evidence.66  Finally, 
and quite recently, the Court decided that running from the police (even after 
incidents like the beating of Rodney King) in high crime neighborhoods is 
sufficient to constitute “reasonable suspicion” justifying a temporary 
detention.67  This was true even if the police did not know what crime the 
person was suspected of committing.68  This decision is regrettable, especially 
in the face of widespread reports of police using terror and being involved in 
drug trafficking and extortion.69 
 
 59. Id. at 30. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 62. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 63. See, e.g., State v. Barber, 823 P.2d 1068 (Wash. 1992). 
 64. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359 (Neb. 1992). 
 65. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
 66. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
 67. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000). 
 68. See id. 
 69. In 1997 alone, there were 1768 complaints of misconduct against New York City Police 
and the city had to pay $19.5 million in damages as a result. Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, When 
Brutality Wears a City Badge, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at A1, A25; Deborah Sontag & Dan 
Barry, Challenge To Authority: A Special Report; Disrespect as a Catalyst for Brutality, N.Y 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at A1.  Six Philadelphia police officers, five white and one Asian, pleaded 
guilty to conducting illegal searches, planting evidence, and lying under oath.  Fifty-six drug 
convictions involving the officers have been overturned and 1,600 other arrests between 1987 and 
1994 are being reviewed.  Michael Janofsky, A Philadelphia Police Scandal Results in a Plan for 
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Police have notoriously concentrated their enforcement of routine traffic 
laws against African-Americans and other minorities as a pretext to conduct a 
narcotics investigation, especially in the current “War on Drugs.”  Among 
critics, the practice is known as “driving while black.”70  Police stop someone 
for speeding, failing to signal, or even for having a defective license plate light, 
and then look for further suspicious conduct or request permission for a 
“consent search” of the automobile.  While some courts earlier claimed that 
such a stop was legal only if a reasonable police officer would have stopped 
the person for the same violations,71 the Supreme Court gave its stamp of 
approval for such “pretext” stops.72 
The Supreme Court has also approved the practice in around 28 states73 of 
allowing a full custodial arrest of a person for minor traffic violations, the 
subsequent search of that person,74 and the passenger compartment of his car, 
without probable cause.75  Thus, a minor violation of the state vehicle code 
could lead to a full search for narcotics, otherwise not permissible due to the 
absence of reasonable suspicion to detain or probable cause to search.  The 
Supreme Court has also allowed police departments to implement “inventory 
policies” permitting them to tow automobiles to the police department and 
search them without probable cause when the driver has been arrested.76  Even 
if the car was searched illegally at the scene of the arrest, courts have admitted 
evidence because it would “inevitably” have been discovered as a result of the 
police inventory policies.77 
 
Suit Claiming Racism,  N.Y TIMES,  Dec. 12, 1995, at D23.  Six police officers in Atlanta were 
arrested for robbing drug dealers and extorting money from citizens for protection.  Ronald 
Smothers, 6 Held in Atlanta Police Corruption Case. N.Y TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at A12.  Up to 
3,200 criminal cases in Los Angeles may have to be reviewed as a result of an inquiry into police 
corruption. The charges range from selling cocaine taken from an evidence locker to murder.  
Thirteen officers have been suspended and up to 100 may have falsified evidence. Duncan 
Campbell, Police Corruption Embroils LA in a Legal Nightmare, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 
WEEKLY, Jan. 6-12, 2000, at 5. 
 70. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: the Supreme 
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops. 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546 (1997). 
 71. Cf. U.S. v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 72. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 73. Barbara C. Salken. The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth 
Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses.  62 TEMPLE L. REV. 
221, 250 (1989). 
 74. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 
260, 266 (1973). 
 75. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
 76. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 
367, 375-76 (1987). 
 77. United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Seals, 
987 F.2d 1102, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 978 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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Such “pretext” stops are also made of persons on foot in high crime 
communities.  In St. Louis, for example, city police routinely arrest young 
black males for violations of the St. Louis Municipal Code for “street 
demonstration,” an ordinance aimed at preventing sales, singing, juggling, or 
other activity that could disturb traffic.78  Police then search a suspect incident 
to arrest to get around Fourth Amendment limitations. 
Groups of citizens are now bringing civil suits against police departments 
for alleged “racial profiling,” that is, singling out blacks or Hispanic 
Americans for discriminatory enforcement of, for instance, the traffic laws or 
for random stops without reasonable suspicion to investigate drug-trafficking.79  
Presidential candidate Bill Bradley even made it an issue in his presidential 
campaign.80 
Even if courts admit that police have violated the Fourth Amendment in 
conducting a search, evidence is still admissible if, for instance, a police officer 
relied “in good faith” on a search warrant issued by a judge.81  The Burger 
Court decided that the only reason for excluding evidence seized in violation 
of the Constitution was to deter unlawful police conduct, not to protect the 
rights of citizens.82  It also ruled that only someone whose privacy rights have 
been violated may move to suppress incriminating evidence found as a result 
of an unlawful search at trial.83  Thus, police may illegally stop and search an 
automobile with several passengers in it, and, only the driver of the automobile 
has “standing” to question the validity of the search at trial.84 
 
 78. ST. LOUIS, MO. ORDINANCE 57831, § 17.16.270. 
 79. Brown v. Oneonta, N.Y., 195 F.3d 111, 115 (2nd Cir. 1999); National Congress for 
Puerto Rican Rights v. New York, N.Y., 75 F.Supp.2d 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Maryland State 
Conference of NAACP Branches v. Department of Md. State Police, 72 F. Supp.2d 560, 564 (D. 
Md. 1999); Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1999).  In New Jersey 
at least 17 motions to suppress evidence were granted due to “racial profiling” and the State of 
New Jersey has entered a consent decree compelling the state to collect thorough statistics as to 
the race of persons detained by police. 66 CRIM. L. REP. 251 (2000).  Statistics on the practice are 
now being collected by federal law enforcement agencies, 65 CRIM. L. REP. 292 (2000), and the 
American Bar Association. 65 CRIM. L. REP. 535 (2000). 
 80. See Iver Peterson, Whitman Says Troopers Used Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 
1999, at A1, A23; Jodi Wilgoren, Police Profiling Debate Hinges on Issue of Experience, or on 
Bias, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1999, at A21.  See generally Kevin Flynn, State Cites Racial 
Inequality in New York Police Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1995, at A22.  On racial profiling of 
Hispanics in the States which border on Mexico, which included the stopping of a judge, see Jim 
Yardley, Some Texans Say Border Patrol Singles Out Too Many Blameless Hispanics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at A1, A17. 
 81. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 84. Id. 
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IV. POLICE INTERROGATION AND THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
Once the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was made 
binding on the States,85 the Supreme Court passed the landmark case of 
Miranda v. Arizona86 in an attempt to bring an end to police use of coercion, 
threats, psychological pressure, promises, and deception to get suspects to 
confess in criminal cases.  In doing so, they reviewed police manuals 
documenting the tactics used by police, usually in the 24 to 48 hours between 
arrest and arraignment in court, to coerce a reluctant defendant to confess.87  
Even in the absence of overt coercion, threats, promises, or deception, the 
Warren Court held that custody is itself inherently coercive.88  As a result, the 
Court held that a person in custody had to be advised of his right to be silent 
and to consult with a lawyer before being questioned.89  Before being 
questioned, he had to waive both of these rights.90 
Such admonitions, now accepted in most European jurisdictions,91 are in 
jeopardy in the United States.  Although the Supreme Court initially decided 
that failure to advise a suspect in custody of the so-called Miranda-rights and 
failure to obtain a waiver thereof would result in suppression of any 
statement,92 it later held a statement obtained in violation of Miranda could 
nevertheless be used to impeach a defendant in rebuttal if he testifies contrary 
thereto.93  The Supreme Court then began stating that the Miranda rule was not 
“of constitutional stature” but only a “prophylactic” rule to enforce the Fifth 
Amendment.94  Therefore, any leads gained in a statement taken in violation of 
Miranda could be followed, and evidence thereby gathered would not be 
excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”95  As a result, police departments 
would deliberately not advise suspects of their rights to gather leads or 
evidence to use in impeachment, or after a person invoked his or her rights, the 
police would question them anyway.96  Courts have even admitted statements 
taken in violation of Miranda when the police stated they had a departmental 
policy to do this!97  The Supreme Court has also refused to order suppression 
 
 85. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 86. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 443. 
 91. See, e.g., §§ 163a(3), 136 StPO (Germany); §§ 63, 64(3), 350 CPP (Italy); § 520(2)(a)-
(c) LECr (Spain); Art. 51 Const. RF (Russia). 
 92. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 93. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
 94. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
 95. Id. at 451. 
 96. Davis v. U.S., 724 A.2d 1163 (D.C. App. 1998). 
 97. California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 922 F. Supp. 327, 338 (C.D. Cal. 
1996); People v. Peevy, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865 (Cal. 1998). 
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of statements after the giving of Miranda warnings, even when the suspect “let 
the cat out of the bag” during a custodial interrogation without Miranda 
warnings.98 
In 1968, Congress passed a law repealing Miranda and other progressive 
decisions of the Warren Court,99 but the Attorney General refused to assert this 
law as a reason for allowing the admissibility of statements taken in violation 
of Miranda and courts ignored the entire issue.100  Finally, in 1999, a federal 
district court ruled that the 1968 law had overruled Miranda and the case is 
now before the Supreme Court.101  If Miranda is overturned, the protection 
given to criminal defendants in the United States will fall well below that given 
to defendants in most European countries,102 with the exception, perhaps, of 
France.103 
False confessions have led to a number of innocent persons being 
convicted of murder; some of them have been sentenced to death.104  One 
police precinct in Chicago has been accused of using torture in no less than 
nine convictions for capital murder.105  This torture consisted in the use of 
electric wires, beatings, and systematic asphyxiation.106 
V. THE USE OF UNDERCOVER INFORMANTS 
The American system of unlimited prosecutorial and police discretion and 
draconian sentencing schemes have lead to a mushrooming of the use of 
undercover police informants to snitch on acquaintances and partners in crime 
in order to escape convictions for serious crimes or lengthy terms of 
imprisonment.107  If an informant does not produce in a satisfactory fashion, 
the person can often be sentenced to the full extent of the law.108  As a result, 
 
 98. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994). 
 100. See Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 101. U.S. v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687 cert. granted 120 S.Ct. 578 (1999). 
 102. See, e.g., §§ 163a(3), 136 StPO (Germany); §§ 63, 64(3), 350 CPP (Italy); § 520(2)(a)-
(c) LECr (Spain); Art. 51 Const. RF (Russia). 
 103. See JEAN PRADEL, PROCEDURE PENALE 354-55, 391-98 (9th ed. 1997). 
 104. Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois: A tortured 
path to Death Row, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1999, at 1.  Cf. Carolyn Tuft & Bill Smith, Deputy 
Admits Tricking Convict  into Confessing, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 1999, at A1; Terry 
Ganey, Pardoned Man Wants to “Pick up My Life,” ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Sep. 30, 1995, at 
A1. 
 105. See Mills & Armstrong, supra note 104. 
 106. Id.  The police in Russia employ similar methods. Confessions at Any Cost: Police 
Torture in Russia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1, 21 (2000). 
 107. See FRONTTLINE: “Snitch” available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/snitch/>. 
 108. In Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987), the defendant was charged with capital 
murder in the car bombing assassination of an Arizona reporter who was investigating political 
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informants not only provide evidence used to investigate criminal offenses and 
make arrests, but act as star witnesses for the prosecution.109  It is now a 
common practice for so-called “jailhouse informants” to testify to alleged 
admissions of guilt made by cellmates, sometimes between arrest and 
arraignment, but often after arraignment, filing of charges, and appointment of 
a lawyer.  The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed virtually unlimited questioning 
of pre-arraignment suspects by jailplants110 and has allowed testimony of 
jailplants as to admissions made even after appointment of counsel and filing 
of charges, if the jailplant did not actively engage the suspect in 
conversation.111  Such practices, outlawed in many European countries,112 have 
led to the conviction of many innocent persons and even subsequent death 
sentences.113 
VI. THE VICTORIOUS MARCH OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
Perhaps as a result of the Civil Rights movement, support for the death 
penalty declined steadily in the 1950s and 1960s.114  In 1972, the Supreme 
Court declared that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment and a 
violation of due process not per se, but because of the way it was enforced.115  
Not only were those sentenced to death almost always poor and unable to hire 
a good lawyer, but the sentence was also disproportionately executed against 
racial minorities.116  The determination of who would receive a death sentence 
and who would then be executed had become entirely arbitrary.117  In the same 
year, the Supreme Court of California ruled that the death penalty was cruel 
and unusual punishment under the California Constitution as such.118 
 
corruption in that state. Id. at 3.  In exchange for a guarantee of a 20-year sentence he agreed to 
testify against his two co-defendants.  Id. at 3-4.  They were convicted and Adamson was given 
the agreed-upon sentence.  Id. at 4.  After the co-defendants’ convictions were overturned on 
appeal, Adamson refused to again testify without a guarantee of further reducing his sentence. Id.  
The prosecutor, claiming a violation of the agreement, re-charged Adamson with capital murder 
and dismissed the case against the co-defendants.  Id. at 5.  He was convicted and sentenced to 
death and the Supreme Court upheld his sentence. Id. at 7. 
 109. See Mills & Armstrong, supra note 104. 
 110. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 298 (1990). 
 111. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 
459 (1986). 
 112. For Germany see, e.g., BGHSt 34, 362, at 363-364; BGH, 18 StV, 10/98, at 527, 527-
530. 
 113. Mills & Armstrong, supra note 46, at 1, 8-9. 
 114. Support for the death penalty was around 42% in 1966, rose to 66% by 1976, and now is 
somewhere between 70% and 80%. Tony Mauro & Mark Potok, Death Penalty Becoming ‘Real’ 
Four Could Be Executed This Week, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1994, at 3A. 
 115. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 250. 
 118. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 895 (Cal. 1972). 
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Politicians in the death lobby did not wait.  Legislators in over thirty-five 
states drafted new death penalty laws to remove discretion and guide the 
sentencing decisions of juries.119  In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld several 
of these laws and the moratorium on executions was over.120  Gary Gilmore, 
who refused to appeal and desired to be executed, was killed by firing squad in 
Utah in 1977, and the killing began.121  California amended its Constitution by 
referendum in 1972 to provide that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual 
punishment122 and now thirty-eight states and the federal system impose 
capital punishment for a number of aggravated murders.123 
Since 1977 over 600 persons have been executed in thirty states.124  The 
leader, by far, is Texas, followed closely by other Southern states and 
Missouri.125  Independent investigations by journalists, lawyers, and religious 
groups have revealed that at least eighty-seven innocent persons have been 
sentenced to death.126  In all of these cases, the state has recognized the actual 
innocence of the person, often by virtue of confession of the actual culprit127 or 
DNA evidence.128  It is not known how many innocent persons have been 
executed, sit in custody, or are serving prison sentences.129  One bright spot on 
 
 119. Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital 
Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 800 (1998). 
 120. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 121. See NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER’S SONG 986-88 (1977). 
 122. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 123. The following States have no death penalty: North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, West Virginia, Maine, Vermont, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Alaska. 
Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Yet Another Death Row Inmate Cleared, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 
1999, at 1, 16. 
 124. Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Verdict Errors, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2000, at A1. 
 125. As of December 1999, there had been 445 executions in the Southern States, with 197 in 
Texas, 73 in Virginia, and 44 in Florida.  Missouri had executed 41 persons.  In contrast, only 16 
persons were executed since 1977 in the Northeast U.S. Paul Duggan, To Kill or Not to Kill, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 20-27, 1999, at 31, 33. 
 126. Johnson, supra note 124; Kifner, supra note 6. 
 127. Michael Higgins, Tough Luck for the Innocent Man, ABA JOURNAL 46, 48-9, March 
1999. 
 128. DNA analysis has exonerated 65 persons in the U.S. and in 18 of them prosecutors used 
hair analysis, a notoriously unreliable method, to help convince the jury. Ken Armstrong & Steve 
Mills, The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois: Convicted by a Hair, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 
1999, at 1, 8. 
 129. A study in the mid-1980s found that since 1900, 350 innocent persons had been 
convicted of potentially capital crimes. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of 
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 22-24 (1987).  In 309 of these cases, 
the state had actually recognized the convicted person’s innocence.  Id.  One hundred and thirty-
nine were sentenced to death and, of them, 23 were actually executed. Id. at 35-36, 71.  As of 
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the horizon has been the actions of Illinois Governor George Ryan, a 
Republican and a supporter of the death penalty.  Because twelve of the eighty-
seven erroneous verdicts occurred in his state, he has recently ordered a 
moratorium on executions until a commission completes a study on the reasons 
for such egregious miscarriages of justice.130 
The U.S. Supreme Court and politicians have not stopped at introducing 
the death penalty.  There is a movement to expand the punishment to more 
crimes.  For instance, President Clinton signed a bill expanding the death 
penalty to fifty new offenses.131  State and federal politicians run on platforms 
to strengthen the death penalty and to limit appellate rights of persons 
sentenced to death.132  The Supreme Court has also issued opinions that, in 
many ways, lessen the procedural safeguards in capital cases as compared to 
non-capital cases, strange as that may seem. 
For instance, in choosing a jury, the prosecutor may exclude as “biased” all 
jurors who could not return a death penalty.133  Assuming that between 70% 
and 80% of Americans support the death penalty,134 that means that between 
20% to 30% of the most liberal or compassionate citizens are prevented from 
sitting in capital cases.  This arguably leads to a jury that is more likely to 
reach a guilt-finding.135 
Because prosecutors routinely excluded all prospective black jurors in 
cases where the defendant was black, the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors 
may not exclude all members of a minority group by using peremptory 
 
1992 the number had risen to 416 errors and 29 executions. Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: 
Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61  LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (Autumn 1998). 
 130. Governor Ryan called it a “shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting 
them on death row.” Johnson, supra note 124.  “I cannot support a system, which, in its 
administration, has proven so fraught with error and has come so close to the ultimate nightmare, 
the state’s taking of innocent life.” Id.  He continued: “Until I can be sure that everyone sentenced 
to death in Illinois is truly guilty, until I can be sure with moral certainty that no innocent man or 
woman is facing a lethal injection, no one will meet that fate.”  One hundred fifty persons are 
currently on death row in Illinois.  Id. 
  The State of New Hampshire voted in May 2000 to abolish the death penalty, but the bill 
was vetoed by Democratic Governor Jeanne Shaheen.  Dirk Johnson, No Execution in Illinois 
Until System is Repaired, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2000, <www.nytimes.com>. 
 131. H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (cited in Abner J. Mikva, Fifty-Eighth 
Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: “The Treadmill of Criminal Justice Reform,” 43 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 5, 9 (1995)). 
 132. Bright & Keenan, supra note 12, at 770-76. 
 133. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 515 (1968); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 
174 (1986). 
 134. While approximately 77% of Americans favor death the penalty, this figure drops to 
44% if a person could be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.  The Death 
Penalty: One in Seven Wasn’t Guilty, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 1998, at 29. 
 135. Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An 
Empirical Study and A Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40 (1982). 
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challenges.136  But the Court has now placed the same restriction on the 
defense.137 This has not eliminated discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges and in many death penalty cases after Batson v. Kentucky, the 
prosecutor has been able to justify striking all prospective black jurors on 
“non-racial” grounds.138 
The Supreme Court has also ruled that victims may present evidence about 
the impact of a murder on their lives to arouse the passions of the jury against 
the defendant and lead it to impose a death sentence.139  Despite the fact that 
the death sentence is disproportionately sought and imposed against murderers 
(both black and white) who kill white persons, the Supreme Court has claimed 
this does not constitute unequal enforcement of the law.140 
Though writs of habeas corpus proved an effective vehicle to challenge 
convictions and overturn unjust convictions, legislation141 and decisions of the 
Supreme Court have sought to limit the post-conviction rights of capital 
defendants, especially through preventing repeated writs of habeas corpus to 
challenge final judgments.142 
VII.  DRACONIAN SENTENCES AND THE COERCION OF GUILTY PLEAS 
Besides the death penalty, many United States jurisdictions provide for life 
imprisonments for drug offenses and the repeated commission of non-violent 
property crimes.143  “Three strikes” laws,144 draconian mandatory minimum 
sentences for drugs,145 and other crimes, along with oppressive “sentencing 
guidelines,” effectively prevent trial judges from exercising humane discretion 
 
 136. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 
 137. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). 
 138. This has even included cases where all 26 peremptory challenges were directed against 
black jurors. Bright, supra note 19, at 447-49. 
 139. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 821 (1991). 
 140. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 318-19 (1987). 
 141. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (1994). 
 142. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 496 (1991). 
 143. See U.S. v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that life imprisonment is not 
cruel and unusual punishment under “three strikes” law); Henderson v. State, 910 S.W.2d 656, 
657, 660-61 (Ark. 1995) (holding that life imprisonment for first offense of sale of three rocks of 
cocaine is not cruel and unusual punishment). 
 144. Fox Butterfield, Tough Law on Sentences is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, March, 8, 1996, at 
A14. 
 145. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 33-34 (1991). 
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in meting out sentences.146  This has produced one of the largest prison 
populations in the world,147 despite the recent drop in the crime rate.148 
The level of punishment is a symptom of a culture that throws away 
lawbreakers in much the manner it throws away razors, cameras, and soda pop 
bottles.  But it is also a huge bargaining chip in the hands of prosecutors to get 
an accused to negotiate a guilty plea and avoid a trial.  A jury trial is a time-
consuming, costly procedure.  Furthermore, the outcome, despite the strength 
of the evidence, is always in some doubt.  Much has been written about jury 
nullification in cases where the elements of a crime were undoubtedly 
proven.149  Such results are often the product of sympathy for the defendant, 
antipathy towards the police, and disagreement with the law.150 
In plea negotiations, the threat of going to trial is the best bargaining chip 
of the defense.  Conversely, the threat of draconian punishments is the 
prosecution’s best bargaining chip.  It is, moreover, no secret that judges 
punish more severely following a jury trial than if the defendant had entered a 
 
 146. See generally Albert A. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for 
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991). 
 147. America had a prison population of 1.8 million in 1998.  The incarceration rate rose to 
668 inmates per 100,000 residents in 1998 from 313 per 100,000 in 1985.  In 1972, the inmate 
population was only 330,000.  According to the 1998 Justice Department report, there were 
1,277,866 inmates in state and federal prisons and 592,462 people in jails.  Louisiana leads state 
incarceration rates with 709 inmates per 100,000 residents, and is followed by Texas, Oklahoma, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina.  Minnesota has lowest incarceration rate at 117 per 100,000 
residents.  Blacks made up 41.2% of inmates in 1998, whereas 41.3% were white.  The report 
also found that blacks are six times more likely to be held in jail. Fox Butterfield, Number of 
Inmates Reaches Record 1.8 Million, N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 1999, at A12. 
 148. Crime decreased by seven percent in 1998.  New York City only had 633 homicides in 
1998. This number was down from 770 in 1997. Fox Butterfield, Crime Fell 7 Percent in ‘98 
Continuing a 7-Year Trend, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at A12.  New York had as many as 2,245 
murders in 1990, 1,946 in 1993, 1,561 in 1994, and 1,183 in 1995. Clifford Krauss, Reported 
Crimes Continue to Show Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at B3.  In 1998, the nation’s murder 
rate was at its lowest in 30 years at 18,209, which is seven percent lower than in 1996 and 26% 
lower than the 1993 figure.  The rate of 6.8 murders per 100,000 residents is the lowest since 
1967.  The violent crime rate was down four percent to its lowest level since 1987. Crime Drops 
in ‘97; Murders Are at 30-Year Low, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1998, at A16. 
 149. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 168-
77 (1972). 
 150. See Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 
1171-96 (1997) (discussing nullification in four types of situations: (1) uncorrected rule 
violations, (2) norm violations, (3) biased or unjust law application, and (4) upholding of illegal 
and immoral community norms). 
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guilty plea.151  The result is that innocent people sometimes enter guilty pleas 
in order to avoid the possibility of a more severe punishment.152 
When a person elects to go to trial and risk a harsher punishment, the jury, 
in non-capital cases, is usually not told about the parameters of punishment.153  
One television program featured an interview with a juror who had voted to 
convict an eighteen-year old of aiding and abetting a narcotics deal.154  The 
defendant had no criminal record.155  When asked what he thought the 
defendant received as a sentence, the juror replied, “It was a serious case, 
probably five years.”156  In reality, the young man was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.157  This type of system functions only when the jury does not 
know the severity of the punishments.158  This is because in all jurisdictions 
where jury trial has been introduced, knowledge of the punishment 
traditionally led to “sanction nullification” when the populace thought 
sentences were too severe.159  Today, juries have begun to ask whether cases 
involve “three strikes.” Judges usually tell them that issue is none of their 
concern.160 
Legislators have also begun to redefine crimes so that elements of fact that 
can lead to substantially increased sentences have been redefined as 
“sentencing issues.”  These issues are decided by the judge based on a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, rather than by the jury based on 
proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”161  This approach has been accepted with 
regard to both, the visible possession of a firearm162 and prior convictions.163  
 
 151. For a discussion of the reasons for this, see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 900-01. 
 152. A study conducted in the mid-1980s found that there were at least 16 instances were an 
innocent person pleaded guilty to murder.  Bedau & Radelet, supra note 129, at 21.  See also John 
H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978). 
 153. See FRONTLINE, “Snitch” available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/snitch/>. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579-588 (1994) (explaining that the jury’s 
function is to find the facts and decide whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, while 
the judge imposes the sentence after the jury has arrived at a guilty verdict).  This is the rule in 
most criminal cases, with the exception of capital cases. 
 159. For English history, see Thomas A. Green, The English Criminal Trial and the Law-
Finding Tradition on the Eve of the French Revolution in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, 
FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900 41, 49-52 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed. 1987). 
 160. People v. Nichols, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Taylor, 943 
S.W.2d 675, 680 (Mo. App. 1997); State v. Stevens, 949 S.W.2d 257, 257-58 (Mo. App. 1997).  
Some judges have gone against the prevailing law and informed the jury of the sentencing 
parameters. See United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411, 417 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). 
 161. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 39, at 1121. 
 162. McMillan v. United States, 477 U.S. 79, 91-93 (1986). 
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However, a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court may have 
partially put a stop to this practice.164 
VIII.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
Theoretically, the assistance of counsel is well-protected by the Sixth 
Amendment.  According to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment, criminal defendants have a right to appointed counsel if they are 
subject to imprisonment and are indigent.165 
Several different systems exist to supply counsel for indigent defendants.  
Public Defender Offices exist in many states and counties to represent indigent 
criminal defendants.  Several models exist.  In California, for instance, it is up 
to the forty-eight counties to determine the type of appointed counsel program 
they wish to implement.166  In larger metropolitan counties, the county itself 
runs a large law office, which is entrusted with the defense of the indigent.167  
Typically, the Chief Public Defender is a civil servant hired by the governing 
body of the county.168  In San Francisco City and County, however, the public 
defender is an elected official.169  In Alameda County, California, where I 
worked as a Public Defender for eleven and a half years, branch offices of the 
public defender exist in all of the municipal courts, and in the Superior Court, 
where felonies are tried.  Representation is handled with a combination of bulk 
assignments of cases at the preliminary stages.  One or two attorneys will 
handle all arraignments in misdemeanor and felony cases in the municipal 
court, as well as the plea negotiations and pre-trial motion settings.  But an 
individual lawyer will be assigned the case if it proceeds to trial.  In the felony 
court, cases will be assigned vertically and will be handled by an individual 
attorney from arraignment through to trial or plea.  An exception is made for 
murder cases, and especially capital cases.  In these cases, the lawyer is 
appointed vertically immediately after arrest, to handle the case through all of 
its stages.170  A Public Defender office can represent a large number of 
 
 163. Almendariz-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-47 (1998). 
 164. Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1226-28 (1999). 
 165. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972). 
 166. Robert Sangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32 (1995). 
 167. For instance, Los Angeles County, where the first Public Defender Office in the nation 
was opened in 1914 and Alameda County, which opened an office in 1927. Anthony Platt & 
Randi Pollock, Channeling Lawyers: The Careers of Public Defenders, 9 ISSUES IN 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3-5 (1974). 
 168. See, e.g., id. at 5-6. 
 169. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public 
Defender, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 199, 205 (1999). 
 170. The Cook County Public Defender in Chicago has a horizontal system divided into 
various stages: interview, first appearance, bail and custody hearing, trial and appeal.  Kim 
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defendants much more economically than can individual lawyers, if appointed 
to represent all defendants in a vertical manner.  They can also pool their 
resources through such practices as the use of common investigators.171 
In some counties in California, the county government has a system of 
“private” public defenders.  The county asks for the best bid of private lawyers 
who will assume all of the defense work for the indigent.  This system has 
been implemented in San Diego County.172  In smaller rural counties, however, 
the court will appoint lawyers from a list of private lawyers who have 
expressed their willingness to take criminal appointments.  Requirements for 
such court-appointment regimes vary.  In some areas, there are strict rules as to 
how much experience a lawyer must have to represent a particular gravity of 
offense.  In others, courts appoint lawyers eminently unqualified to try criminal 
cases.  Even civil or tax lawyers have been appointed to try capital cases, 
despite the fact that they have never tried a criminal case before.173  On many 
occasions, the appointment of incompetent or ethically compromised lawyers 
has arguably led to the imposition of unjust death sentences.174 
Missouri’s approach to the representation of indigent defendants contrasts 
with that of California.  The Missouri Public Defender is a statewide operation, 
which undertakes the representation of all indigent defendants.  Branches of 
the Public Defender are located in each county, region, or metropolitan area. 
The quality of defense counsel is more important in an adversarial system 
like that of the United States than in a neo-inquisitorial system where the judge 
has a duty to ascertain the truth.  In a neo-inquisitorial system, the judge is 
responsible for ensuring the case has been fairly and thoroughly investigated 
and that all of the exculpatory and inculpatory evidence has been presented.175  
Judges in the United States play no such role.  Rather, they act as passive 
arbiters to ensure that the rules of the game are not breached.  It is up to the 
parties to investigate their respective cases.  Furthermore, the prosecution 
always has an advantage because it can use the state and local police (or FBI or 
 
Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public 
Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2425 (1996). 
 171. An exception to the rule of horizontal representation exists in the Public Defender 
Service of Washington, D.C., where there has been an attempt to limit the caseload of attorneys 
and to offer vertical representation such as would be provided at a typical law office.  Id. at 2427-
28. 
 172. In 1993, one Georgia county cut the cost of its indigent-defense budget by awarding the 
contract to a lawyer who, at $25,000 a year, bid almost $20,000 less than the other two bidders.  
He tried only one felony case in front of a jury while pleading 213 other cases.  The Criminal 
Law:  Too Poor To Be Defended, THE ECONOMIST, April 11, 1998 at 22. 
 173. Armstrong & Mills, supra note 128, at 8-9. 
 174. Id.  For an incisive criticism, see Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The 
Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783 (1997). 
 175. § 310 CPP (France); § 244(II) StPO (Germany).  PRADEL, supra note 103, at 693. 
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other federal police agencies), their task forces, laboratories, and experts to 
investigate a case.  Many death sentences have been challenged, and some 
overturned, because defense counsel did not seriously investigate an important 
excuse or justification.176  In addition, several challenges have arisen due to 
defense counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence that could have saved 
a defendant’s life.177 
Defense investigation is doubly important because the prosecution is often 
not constitutionally or statutorily bound to disclose its case.  Although the 
Supreme Court has ruled that the prosecution must divulge exculpatory 
evidence or evidence that could serve to mitigate a sentence,178 the prosecution 
still has no duty to look for exculpatory evidence.179  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has said that failure to divulge exculpatory or mitigating 
evidence only constitutes a violation of due process if the reviewing court 
decides that the disclosure and admission of such evidence would have yielded 
a different verdict.180  Thus, the appellate court must weigh, with hindsight, the 
effect the evidence would have had on the jury.  The upshot is that the 
prosecution is forced to make a preliminary decision as to whether a reviewing 
court will find that the exculpatory evidence would have tilted the scales in the 
defendant’s favor.  Such a process invites the prosecutor to take a gamble. 
The evidence often concealed by prosecutors consists of deals made with 
informants or other prosecution witnesses to gather evidence.181  These deals 
may consist of the dismissal of pending criminal cases, refusing to charge 
cases, the offer of attractive plea-bargains, admission into witness protection 
programs, or even monetary payments, often on a piecework basis.182  The 
concealed information might also be the mere evidence that the witness is a 
 
 176. Cf. Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967) (insanity defense); Henderson v. 
Sargent, 926 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1991) (others with motive to commit crime). 
 177. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Strickland provides the 
standard for addressing a claim of “ineffectiveness of counsel.”  Id. at 683.  The Court determined 
that the proper standard for attorney performance is that of “reasonably effective assistance.” Id. 
at 687.  In Strickland, the defendant alleged that his attorney had failed to investigate and present 
mitigating evidence. Id. at 675.  Despite the fact that the counsel’s performance was woefully 
inadequate, the Supreme Court determined that a case will not be reversed if the error had no 
effect on the judgment. Id. at 691.  The Court therefore found that the defendant had suffered 
insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death sentence.  Id. at 691.  For cases applying 
Strickland and setting aside death sentences due to ineffective assistance of counsel, see Glenn v. 
Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1208-11 (6th Cir. 1995) and Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 (9th Cir. 
1998).  But see the recent decision of Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). 
 178. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 179. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 868-74 (1982). 
 180. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
 181. In United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995), for instance, police let Chicago 
gang members have sex with female visitors and use drugs in the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  In 
addition, the prosecution did not disclose perjured testimony.  Id. at 243. 
 182. See United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308, 1398-1417 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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government informant.183  Because informant testimony is so dangerous, and 
because courts are willing to find that the prosecution’s errors are harmless, 
there is a great incentive for prosecutors to bolster witness credibility.  The 
prosecution does this by withholding information or not revealing the perjury 
of their witnesses when they falsely answer questions by the defense.184 
The quality of the defense provided by Public Defender Offices and by 
appointed counsel varies, as does the quality of privately retained counsel.  
One factor that affects the quality of the service provided is the salary the 
attorney is paid.  In Alameda County, California, for example, the public 
defenders finally won parity in salary with the county District Attorney’s 
Office.  Such parity does not exist in St. Louis.  Even in offices with low pay 
scales, however, many young lawyers become Public Defenders because of an 
idealistic desire to defend the poor, especially in view of how unfair the system 
functions in practice.  But even the most idealistic lawyers have difficulty 
providing a quality defense due to the heavy caseload they must shoulder. 
In some states, most notably in the South, public defender offices, if they 
exist, are woefully understaffed, underpaid, and overworked.185  Where private 
counsel come in, they are often friends of the judge or prosecutor and only 
provide a lukewarm or lackluster defense so as to “keep the system 
working.”186  The hourly wage of court-appointed lawyers is often ridiculously 
 
 183. People v. Wright, 658 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1995). 
 184. Since 1963, at least 381 homicide convictions nationwide have been overturned because 
prosecutors concealed evidence of innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false. Alan 
Berlow, The Wrong Man, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1, 1999, at 74. 
 185. Defenders often must work within the constraints of limited experience and resources in 
counties with few murders and small budgets.  One example of such a case arose in Montgomery 
County, Illinois.  David Grigsby, only two years out of law school, was appointed to represent 
Tuhran Lear.  Lear was charged with the 1988 murder of a gas station manager.  Grigsby had 
never tried a murder case.  As the county’s public defender he had to juggle 100 other cases.  He 
had no investigator and the court refused his request for expert sentencing help.  Similarly, 
Matthew A. Maloney, the part-time public defender for Bureau County, Illinois, was appointed to 
represent Jeffrey Rissley in connection with the 1991 kidnapping and murder of a six-year old 
girl.  When refused an investigator, he quit.  The court then appointed John Hedrich, a civil 
lawyer who specialized in probate and real estate.  Rissley pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 
death. Armstrong & Mills, supra note 128, at 1, 8-9.  See also The Criminal Law, supra note 172, 
at 21 (stating that each public defender in Louisville, Kentucky must handle 750 cases per year). 
 186. Septuagenarian Texas lawyer Joe Frank Cannon, is well-liked by elected judges because 
he tries death penalty cases very fast, virtually without any preparation.  Eight of his clients have 
been sentenced to death, one has been executed, and another has been murdered in prison.  In one 
case he slept through crucial portions of the trial and the death sentence was nevertheless upheld. 
Paul M. Barrett, On the Defense: Lawyer’s Fast Work On Death Cases Raises Doubts About 
System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1994, at A1, A4. See also Bruce Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer 
Syndrome, THE NATION, April 7, 1997 at 27. 
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low.187  It is no surprise that there has virtually never been a wealthy person 
sentenced to death in the United States.188 
On the other hand, some public defender offices have specialized teams to 
try murder cases or even death-penalty cases, such as in Missouri.  Special 
offices have also been established in some states to provide post-conviction 
support for those who are sentenced to death.  Such offices often depend on the 
whim of politics.  The California Appellate Project counseled California 
lawyers in the handling of capital appeals.  This program, like several others 
throughout the country lost much of its funding when federal aid to capital 
defense offices was slashed.189  Congress then passed the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Bill of 1996.190  This bill was signed by President 
Clinton, and was designed to speed up executions.  Pursuant to this bill, states 
had to show they were providing well-qualified appellate defense.191  Thus, the 
Supreme Court of California recently financed the “Habeas Corpus Center” to 
more effectively handle collateral attacks on death judgments.192  This will 
enable California to opt in under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, and, therefore, speed up executions. 
IX. THE UNITED STATES AS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATOR 
It is no surprise that Amnesty International has singled out the United 
States, of all prosperous industrialized democracies, as a massive violator of 
human rights the area of the administration of criminal justice.  The respected 
human rights organization declared, “Human rights violations in the United 
States of America are persistent, wide-spread and appear to disproportionately 
 
 187. Private lawyers in Virginia earn a maximum fee of $265 for felony cases that carry a 
sentence of up to 20 years and $575 if the potential penalty is more than 20 years.  In contrast, 
Alabama pays defense lawyers $20 per hour, with a $1,000 maximum to prepare for a death-
penalty case.  Mississippi’s maximum pay is $1,000 above overhead expenses for work in the 
courtroom during a death-penalty case.  The Criminal Law, supra note 172, at 21. 
 188. See generally Bright, supra note 19, at 433. 
 189. Lis Wiehl, A Program for Death-Row Appeals is Facing Elimination, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
11, 1995, at B16. 
 190. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-132, 110 
STAT. 1214. 
 191. Currently, the Missouri Capital Appeals Office cannot afford to pay private attorneys 
more than $5,000 to $10,000 to represent a prisoner.  Missouri wants to opt in to the federal Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.  In the opinion of Attorney General Jay Nixon, this 
might enable Missouri to shorten the time on Death Row from ten to six years. Tim Bryant, 
Officials Try to Shorten Time Between Sentence, Execution, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, April 30, 
1997, at 3A. 
 192. Abraham McLaughlin, 98 Executions in ‘99 Reignite a Capital Debate: Moratorium 
Talk Grows on Use of the Death Penalty, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 27, 1999, at 1. 
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affect people of racial or ethnic minority backgrounds.”193  German Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer recently announced that the European Union would 
submit an anti-death-penalty resolution to the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission condemning unnamed countries for “the execution of minors, of 
the mentally ill, enforcement before completion of ongoing procedures, and 
extradition to countries where the death penalty is in force.”194  Clearly, the 
United States was the main target of this resolution.  This is evidenced first by 
the fact that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment of the 
Constitution, proscribing cruel and unusual punishment, to allow the execution 
of juveniles of sixteen and seventeen years of age.195  The Court has also held 
that it does not violate the Constitution to execute mentally retarded 
murderers.196 
This state of affairs is a serious blemish on a country that is in a period of 
unequalled prosperity.  The economic boom, rather than achieving more 
equality in the distribution of income, has done the opposite to a large extent: it 
has increased the quantity of those at the extremes of the income-spectrum, the 
rich and the poor.197  Arguments about where to invest the budget surplus 
focus primarily on whether to use it to save Social Security, or to return it to 
taxpayers by lowering taxes.  What is needed is a Marshall Plan for the “Other 
America,” the America that does not pay taxes, is unemployed or 
underemployed, has some of the worst schools in the world, and is a breeding 
ground for crime—both self-destructive (drug sales and use) and destructive of 
others (usually also members of these communities). 
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But in the meantime, the administration of criminal justice is used to 
eliminate or warehouse the children of America’s inequality.  The prison 
industry is itself a booming business that adds to the hypocritical euphoria in 
which the country now wallows.  The ruling economical and political classes 
forget that the criminals are all our children: born in our hospitals, raised in our 
families (or lack of them), and educated in our schools.  When these 
institutions do their jobs inadequately, their miserable products are warehoused 
or annihilated so we don’t have to think about them any more.  They are 
internal aliens.  A great country must solve these problems.  They have not 
come close to being solved. 
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